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Abstract—In this paper we present a modification
of Reed-Solomon codes that beats the Guruswami-
Sudan 1 −
√
R decoding radius of Reed-Solomon codes
at low rates R. The idea is to choose Reed-Solomon
codes U and V with appropriate rates in a (U | U + V )
construction and to decode them with the Koetter-
Vardy soft information decoder. We suggest to use a
slightly more general version of these codes (but which
has the same decoding performance as the (U | U + V )-
construction) for being used in code-based cryptogra-
phy, namely to build a McEliece scheme. The point
is here that these codes not only perform nearly as
well (or even better in the low rate regime) as Reed-
Solomon codes, but also that their structure seems to
avoid the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack which broke a
previous McEliece proposal based on generalized Reed-
Solomon codes.
I. Introduction
Improving upon the error correction performance of RS
codes. Reed-Solomon (RS) codes are among the most
extensively used error correcting codes. It has long been
known how to decode them up to half the minimum
distance. This gives a decoding algorithm that corrects a
fraction 1−R2 of errors in an RS code of rate R. However
it is only in the late nineties that a breakthrough was
obtained in this setting with Sudan’s algorithm [17] and
its improvement in [8] who showed how to go beyond this
barrier with an algorithm which in its [8] version decodes
any fraction of errors smaller than 1−
√
R. Later on, it was
shown that this decoding algorithm could also be modified
a little bit in order to cope with soft information on the
errors [9]. Then it was realized in [14] that by a slight mod-
ification of RS codes and by an increase of the alphabet
size it was possible to beat the 1 −
√
R decoding radius.
Their new family of codes is list decodable beyond this
radius for low rate. Then, [7] improved on these codes by
presenting a new family of codes, namely folded RS codes
with a polynomial time decoding algorithm achieving the
list decoding capacity 1−R−ε for every rate R and ε > 0.
The first purpose of this paper is to present another
modification of RS codes that improves the fraction of
errors that can be corrected. It consists in using RS
codes in a (U | U + V ) construction. We will show that,
in the low rate regime, this class of codes outperforms
rather significantly a classical RS code decoded with the
Guruswami and Sudan decoder [8]. The point is that this
(U | U + V ) code can be decoded in two steps :
1) First by subtracting the left part y1 to the right part
y2 of the received vector (y1|y2) and decoding it with
respect to V . In such a case, we are left with decoding
a RS code with about twice as many errors.
2) Secondly, once we have recovered the right part v of
the codeword, we can get a word (y1, y2 − v) which
should match two copies of a same word u of U . We
can model this decoding problem by having some soft
information.
It turns out that the last channel error model is much
less noisy than the original q-ary symmetric channel we
started with. This soft information can be used in Koetter
and Vardy’s decoding algorithm. By this means we can
choose U to be a RS code of much bigger rate than V .
All in all, it turns out that by choosing U and V with
appropriate rates we can beat the 1 −
√
R bound in the
low-rate regime.
It should be noted however that beating this 1 −
√
R
bound comes at the cost of having now an algorithm which
does not work as for the aforementioned papers [7], [8],
[14], [17] for every error of a given weight (the so called
adversarial error model) but with probability 1− o(1) for
errors of a given weight. However contrarily to [7], [14]
which results in a significant increase of the alphabet size
of the code, our alphabet size actually decreases when
compared to a RS code: it can be half of the code length
and can be even smaller when we apply this construction
recursively. Indeed, we will show that we can even im-
prove the error correction performances by applying this
construction again to the U and V components, i.e. we
can choose U to be a (U1|U1 + V1) code and we replace
in the same way the RS code V by a (U2|U2 + V2) where
U1, U2, V1, V2 are RS codes.
Application to cryptography. In a second part of the
paper we show how to use such codes (or codes derived
by this approach) for cryptographic purposes, i.e. in a
McEliece cryptosystem [11]. Recall that this public-key
cryptosystem becomes more and more fashionable due to
the threats on the most popular public key cryptosystems
used today, namely RSA or DSA and ECDSA that would
be completely broken by Shor’s algorithm [15] if a large
scale quantum computer could be built. Indeed, it is un-
likely that a quantum computer would be able to threaten
the security of the McEliece scheme because it is based
on an NP-complete problem, namely decoding a random
linear code.
Probably one of the main drawbacks of McEliece when
compared to RSA, DSA or ECDSA is its rather large key
size. There have been several attempts to decrease the key
size either by moving to more structured codes or to codes
which have better error correction radius [2], [13]. Many of
the structured algebraic proposals have been broken (see
for instance [6]) but some of the quasi-cyclic code families
that rely on modified LDPC codes or MDPC codes [1],
[12] seem to resist cryptanalysis up to now. Relying on
codes with better decoding performance met a similar fate,
since here again many proposals of this kind have been
broken. For instance [13] suggests to replace the binary
Goppa codes of the original McEliece cryptosystem by
Generalized RS codes (GRS) because of their much better
decoding performance, but it got broken in [16].
There have been several attempts to repair GRS codes
in this context either by adding random columns to the
generator matrix of a GRS code [19] or by multiplying
this generator matrix by the inverse of a sparse matrix
with small average row weight m [2]. The [19] attempt
got broken in [4] and the parameters of [2] got broken in
[5] because m was chosen to be too small. The problem
with the approach in [2] is that the attack of [5] fails when
m = 2, but the solution is then no more competitive when
compared to a Goppa code because the decoding radius
gets also scaled down by a multiplicative factor of m when
compared to a GRS code.
We suggest here to revive the approach in [2] with a
generalized (U | U + V ) scheme based on RS codes that
has basically the same decoding capacitiy as a RS code and
that looks in many respects like the [2] scheme withm = 2,
This approach is also related to the approach pioneered by
Wang in [18]. His code can be viewed as a certain subcode
of our (U | U + V ) construction. However the decrease of
the code rate results in a significant deterioration of the
key size when compared to a code with the same error
correction capacity as an RS code.
Due to space reasons, proofs are omitted. For further
details, we refer the readers to [10]. A linear code of length
n, dimension k and distance d over a finite field Fq is
refered to as an [n, k, d]q-code. We will also frequently use
the following notation
Notation 1. For a vector x we denote by x(i) the i-th
coordinate of x.
II. (U | U + V )-construction
This Section is only stated for the q-ary symmetric
channel model. In this section, we recall a few facts about
the (U | U + V ) construction and its decoding.
Definition 1. Let U be an [n, ku, du]q code and V be an
[n, kv, dv]q code. We define the (U | U + V )-construction
of U and V as the linear code:
C = {(u | u + v) | u ∈ U and v ∈ V } .
The code C has parameters [2n, ku + kv,min {2du, dv}]q.
A. Soft-decision decoding of (U | U + V ) codes
Let U and V be two codes with parameters [n, ku, du]q
and [n, kv, dv]q, respectively and C
def= (U | U + V ). Sup-
pose we transmit the codeword (u | u + v) ∈ C over a
noisy channel and we receive the vector: y = (y1 | y2) =
(u | u + v) + (e1 | e2).
Decoding proceeds in two steps:
1) We combine y1 and y2 to find v. That is, we decode
y2 − y1 = v + e2 − e1 with respect to V . In the
case of a soft decoder for V we compute first the
probability prob(v(i) = α|y1(i), y2(i)) for all α in Fq.
This information is then used in a soft decoder for V .
2) We subtract (0 | v) to (y1 | y2) to get (u + e1 |
u + e2) = (z1 | z2). This is a noisy version of (u | u).
We compute now for all α ∈ Fq and all coordinates
i the probabilities prob(u(i) = α|z1(i), z2(i)) which is
then passed to a soft decoder for U .
Let us explain how these probabilities can be computed.
We assume that the noise model is given by a discrete
memoryless channel (DMC) with input alphabet Fq and
output alphabet Y. The received vector is denoted by
y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Yn and the channel model specifies
the transition probabilities with the following matrix Πy
Πiy(α) = prob(α | yi) for i = 1, . . . , n and α ∈ Fq.
Πiy denotes here the i-th column of Πy and Πiy(α) refers to
the entry in the i-th column and row indexed by α ∈ Fq.
We will refer to Π as the q×n reliability matrix of the
codewords symbols. We will see below that this reliability
matrix can also be obtained through the (U | U + V )
decoding process. We will particularly be interested here
in the q-ary symmetric channel model with crossover
probability p (q-SCp). The reliability matrix Πy for q-SCp
is defined as follows:
Πiy(α) = prob (α | yi) =
{
1− p if α = yi
p
q−1 if α 6= yi
Let us recall now how the reliability matrices for the de-
coder of U and V are computed from the initial reliability
matrix.
a) Reliability matrix for the V -decoder: We call in
what follows the error model for the V -decoder the sum
model and denote the associated reliability matrix by
Π⊕Π when Π is the initial reliability matrix. Recall that
before decoding, for each symbol X of V that we want
to decode we compute the difference of two symbols X1
and X2 of the (U | U + V ) code: X = X2 − X1. For
each of these symbols we have a reliability information
prob(X1 = α | Y1) and prob(X2 = β | Y2) where Y1
and Y2 are random variables that are initially the received
symbols corresponding to X1 and X2 after transmission on
the noisy channel but that become sets of received symbols
when we iterate the (U | U + V ) construction as will be
seen. When X1 and X2 are uniformly distributed it can
be verified that
prob(X = α|Y1, Y2) =
∑
β∈Fq
prob(X1 = β|Y1)·prob(X2 = α+β|Y2)
This leads to the following definition.
(Π⊕Π)iy(α)
def=
∑
β∈Fq
Πiy1(β) ·Π
i
y2(α+ β)
where y1 and y2 are the realizations of the channel
transmission of u and u+ v respectively.
b) Reliability matrix for the U -decoder: The compu-
tation of prob(u(i) = α|z1(i), z2(i)) can be performed by
computing the probability that a uniformly distributed
random variable over Fq is equal to α given two received
symbols y1 and y2 for X sent over two memoryless chan-
nels. This probability is readily seen to be equal to
prob(X = α | y1) · prob(X = α | y2)∑
β∈Fq prob(X = β | y1) · prob(X = β | y2)
We denote by Π×Π the reliability matrix (the input) to
a soft-decision decoding algorithm for the code U . Thus,
each element of the reliability matrix Π×Π related to the
aforementioned quantities y and v is defined by:
(Π×Π)iy,v(α)
def=
Πiy1(α) ·Π
i
y2(α+ v(i))∑
β∈Fq Πiy1(β) ·Πiy2(β + v(i))
.
To simplify notation we will generally avoid the depen-
dency on v and simply write (Π×Π)y .
B. Algebraic-soft decision decoding of RS codes
Let us recall how the Koetter-Vardy soft decoder [9] can
be analyzed. By [9, Theorem 12] their decoding algorithm
outputs a list that contains the codeword c ∈ C if
〈Π, bcc〉√
〈Π,Π〉
≥
√
k − 1 + o(1)
as the codelength n tends to infinity, where bcc represents
a q × n matrix with entries ci,α = 1 if ci = α, and
0 otherwise; and 〈A,B〉 def=
∑q
i=1
∑n
j=1 ai,jbi,j . We will
consider here only discrete symmetric channel models that
are defined below. Let us first introduce some notation.
Notation 2 (Probability error vector of a DMC). For a
given DMC with q-ary inputs we denote by π the probability
vector π = (prob(x = α|y))α∈Fq where x is the symbol that
has been sent through the channel and y is the received
vector. For a vector x = (xβ)β∈Fq we denote by x+α the
vector x+α = (xβ+α)β∈Fq .
By viewing π as a random variable, we define as in [3]
a symmetric channel by
Definition 2 (Discrete symmetric channel with q-ary
inputs). A DMC with q-ary inputs is said to be symmetric
if and only if for any α in Fq we have
pαprob(π = p) = p0prob(π = p+α). (1)
Note that this implies that for a discrete symmetric
channel, for any possible realization p of the probability
vector π (i.e. when prob(π = p) 6= 0) we necessarily have
p0 6= 0. It is proved in [3] that symmetric channels are
closed under the + and × operations on channels defined
in Subsection II-A. We give now the asymptotic behavior
for a symmetric channel of the Koetter-Vardy decoder.
The proof of this theorem is found in the full version of
this paper [10].
Theorem 3. Let (Cn)n≥1 be an infinite family of Reed-
Solomon codes of rate ≤ R. Denote by qn the alphabet size
of Cn that is assumed to be a non decreasing sequence that
goes to infinity with n. Consider an infinite family of qn-
ary symmetric channels with associated probability error
vectors πn such that E
(
||πn||2
)
has a limit as n tends to
infinity. Let
CKV
def= lim
n→∞
E
(
||πn||2
)
.
This infinite family of codes can be decoded correctly by the
Koetter-Vardy decoding algorithm with probability 1− o(1)
as n tends to infinity as soon as there exists ε > 0 such
that
R ≤ CKV − ε.
Remark 1. Let us observe that for the q-SCp we have
E
(
||π||2
)
= (1−p)2 +(q−1) p
2
(q − 1)2 = (1−p)
2 +O
(
1
q
)
.
By letting q going to infinity, we recover in this way the
performances of the Guruswami-Sudan algorithm which
works as soon as R < (1− p)2.
III. Correcting errors beyond the
Guruswami-Sudan bound
A. The (U | U + V )-construction
Now suppose we choose U and V as RS codes in a
(U | U + V ) construction. We start with a q-ary symmetric
channel with error probability p. Recall that the reliability
matrix for the U -decoder is Π1 = Π × Π whereas for the
V -decoder it is Π2 = Π⊕Π.
Lemma 4. Let πU and πV be the probability vectors
corresponding to decoding the codes U and V respectively.
• The channel error model of the code V is a q-SCp′ with
p1
def= 2p− p2 and
E
(
||πV ||2
)
= (1−p1)2 +O
(
1
q
)
= (1−p)4 +O
(
1
q
)
.
• For the channel error model of the code U we have
E
(
||πU ||2
)
= (2 + p)(1− p)
2
2− p +O
(
1
q
)
.
By letting q going to infinity, we recover the performance
of the (U | U + V ) construction which works as soon as
R <
(p3 − 4p2 + 4p− 4)(1− p)2
2(p− 2)
From Fig. 2 we deduce that the (U | U + V ) decoder
outperforms the RS decoder with Guruswami-Sudan as
soon as R < 0.168.
B. Recursive application of the (U | U + V ) construction
Now we will study what happens over the q-SCp if
we apply recursively the (U | U + V ) construction. So we
start with a (U | U + V ) code, we choose U to be a
(U1 | U1 + V1) code and V to be a (U2 | U2 + V2) code,
where U1, U2, V1 and V2 are RS codes over the same
alphabet Fq and of the same length. In other words, we
look for a code of the form
(U1 | U1 + V1 | U1 + U2 | U1 + U2 + V1 + V2) =
{(u1|u1 + v1|u1 + u2|u1 + u2 + v1 + v2) : ui ∈ Ui,vi ∈ Vi}
From now on, we will refer to this structure as the
(U | U + V )-second level construction.
On the following we obtain the channel error models for
decoding U1, V1, U2 and V2 respectively, their reliability
matrices are given by Π1 × Π1, Π1 ⊕ Π1, Π2 × Π2 and
Π2 ⊕Π2 respectively (see Fig. 1).
Π
Π1 = Π×Π
Π1 ×Π1 Π1 ⊕Π1
Π2 = Π⊕Π
Π2 ×Π2 Π2 ⊕Π2
Fig. 1: The channel error models for decoding U1 (Π1×Π1),
V1 (Π1 ⊕Π1), U2 (Π2 ×Π2) and V2 (Π2 ⊕Π2).
Lemma 5. Let πUi and πVi be the probability vectors
corresponding to decoding the Ui’s and Vi’s.
• The channel error model of the code V2 is a q-SCp2
with p2
def= 2p1 − p12 and
E
(
||πV2 ||
2
)
= (1−p2)2 +O
(
1
q
)
= (1−p)8 +O
(
1
q
)
;
• E
(
||πU2 ||
2
)
= (2+p1)(1−p1)
2
(2−p1) +O
(
1
q
)
;
• E
(
||πV1 ||
2
)
= (2+p)
2(1−p)4
(2−p)2 +O
(
1
q
)
;
• E
(
||πU1 ||
2
)
= (5p
3−6p2−5p−4)(1−p)2
3p−4 +O
(
1
q
)
.
By letting q going to infinity, we recover the perfor-
mance of this construction which works (in the asymptotic
regime) as soon as
R < lim
q→∞
∑2
i=1 E
{
||πUi ||
2
}
+ E
{
||πUi ||
2
}
4
From Figure 2 we deduce that if we apply the
(U | U + V )-second level construction we get better per-
formance than decoding a classical RS code with the
Guruswami-Sudan decoder for low rate codes, specifically
for R < 0.326.
Fig. 2: Rate plotted against the crossover error prob-
ability p for several algorithms. The red line refers
to the Guruswami-Sudan algorithm, the blue line to
the (U | U + V )-construction and the green line to the
(U | U + V )-second level construction.
C. Runtime of the Algorithm
The runtime of Koetter-Vardy (KV) soft decoder is
identical to the Sudan algorithm except for the “soft
interpolation step” related with an optimal multiplicity
matrix M . Asymptotically, for large code length, the
optimal multiplicity matrix M becomes proportional to
the reliability matrix Π of the decoder.
Definition 3. Given a matrix M = (mij) ∈ Zq×n≥0 . We
define its cost as:
Cost(M) = 12
q∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
mij(mij + 1) =
1
2 〈M,M〉+ 〈M,1〉
where 1 denotes the all-one matrix.
The cost of the chosen multiplicity matrix gives exactly
the number of linear equations that we have to solve in
the soft interpolation step. Thus, it is easy to check that
the decoder associated with the (U | U + V )-construction
has a similar runtime as the KV decoder (even lower for
small values of the error rate p). Moreover, the runtime of
the (U | U + V )-second level construction is always lower
than both mentioned decoders.
Lemma 6. The cost of the reliability matrix of the
(U | U + V )-construction is:
Cost(Π⊕Π) + Cost(Π×Π)
2 =
(p4 − 5p3 + 8p2 − 10p+ 8)(1− p)
4(2− p)
IV. A new Mc-Eliece scheme
As we have seen, this (U | U + V ) construction gives
codes which in the low rate regime have even better
error correction capacities than a standard RS code. This
suggests to use such codes in a McEliece cryptosystem to
replace the original Goppa codes. These (U | U + V ) codes
do not only have a better error correction capacity, they
also allow to avoid the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack [16]
that broke a previous proposal based on GRS codes [13].
Furthermore we can even strengthen the security of this
scheme by using instead of the (U | U + V ) construction
a generalized (U | U + V ) code which has trivially the
same error-correction capacity as the (U | U + V ) con-
struction but with better minimum distance properties
which seems essential to avoid attacks based on finding
minimum weight codewords in the code and trying to
unravel the code structure from those minimum weight
codewords. Analyzing precisely attacks of this kind needs
however additional tools due to the peculiar structure
of these generalized (U | U + V ) codes (it is for instance
inappropriate to use the analysis done for random codes)
and is out of scope of this paper.
Definition 4. Let (U, V ) be a pair of codes with parame-
ters [n, ku, du]q and [n, kv, dv]q, respectively. Consider the
following matrix
D =
(
D1 D3
D2 D4
)
∈ Fn×nq
where the Di’s are diagonal matrices such that D is
non singular. We define the generalized (U | U + V )-
construction of U and V with respect to D as the matrix
product code:
{(uD1 + vD2 | uD3 + vD4) | u ∈ U and v ∈ V } .
It is denoted by [U, V ] ·D.
It is readily verified that this code has parameters
[2n, ku + kv, d] with
min{2du, dv} ≤ d ≤ min{2du, 2dv}.
Note that the minimum distance of this generalized
(U | U + V ) can supersede the minimum distance of the
standard (U | U + V ) construction which is equal to
min{2du, dv}.
Let U and V be codes with generator matrices Gu and
Gv, respectively. It is a simple exercise to show that(
GuD1 GuD3
GvD2 GvD4
)
is a generator matrix for [U, V ] ·D.
These generalized (U | U + V ) codes based on RS con-
stituent codes have clearly an efficient decoding which
is similar to the (U | U + V )-decoder. There are only a
few differences: when we receive a word (y1,y2) we just
compute the difference y1D3 − y2D1 which should be a
noisy version of v(D2D3 − D4D1). However the error
correction capacity is the same as the original (U | U + V )
with this kind of decoding algorithm. More precisely, the
McEliece scheme we propose is the following
Key generation:
– Choose U, V as RS codes of some length n.
– Construct a random matrix D as described in
Definition 4.
– Let G be a random generator matrix of the code
C = [U, V ] · D · Σ2n where Σ2n is a permutation
matrix of size 2n and AC a decoding algorithm for
C that typically corrects t errors. It consists in ap-
plying Σ−12n to the received word and then perform-
ing the aforementioned generalized (U | U + V )-
decoder.
The public key and the private key are given respec-
tively by:
Kpub = (G, t) and Ksecret = AC
Encryption: y = mG + e where m is the message
and e is a random error vector of weight at most t.
Decryption: Use Ksecret to retrieve m.
Note that Wang proposed in [18] a very similar scheme,
with the difference that U was a random code and V
a RS code and that he took only a subcode of the
generalized (U | U + V ) code namely the code generated
by
(
GuD1 + GvD2 GuD3 + GvD4
)
. The code rate
loss implied by this choice results in a significant loss
in the key size (since we have to protect ourself against
generic decoders for t errors for a code which is of much
smaller dimension). The fact that U is random in his
scheme however is a rather strong argument in favor of
its security.
Conclusion
This paper introduces a modification of RS codes that
beats the Guruswami-Sudan decoding radius at low rates
(specifically for rates R<0.326). Moreover, it seems to
avoid Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack which makes this con-
struction an interesting candidate to be used in Code-
based Cryptography.
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